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Abstract 
Regional trading agreements are treaties entered into by states.1 States enter into 
regional trading agreements for different reasons some of which are economic, political 
and security reasons. Regional trading agreements (herein after RTAs) have been 
successful in achieving trade liberalization at a much faster speed than the World Trade 
Organization (herein after WTO).2  The most notable example of RTAs is the European 
Communities that has been successful to liberalize both trade in goods and services. 
Members of those Regional Trading Agreements create rules of origin. Rules of 
origin are important in allocating the appropriate duty for imported goods. They tell the 
customs officer where those goods come from. If they come from a country which has a 
trading agreement with the importing state then the product will receive preferential 
treatment. The problem at the moment is that there are over four hundred Regional 
Trading Agreements in the world today.  This proliferation of Regional Trading 
Agreements resulted into a lot of crisscrossing and very complicated rule of origin.  The 
main purpose of this paper is to analyze the different possible solutions for the 
proliferation of Regional Trading Agreements and to propose the most realistic solution 
to the problem.  
To perform this task the paper will be divided into three parts. The paper relied 
both on direct and indirect research methodologies to answer the questions posed by the 
                                                            
1 The word regional trading agreement doesn’t have any geographical connotation. It can be a trade agreement 
between countries in different continents without any geographical boundary links. 
2 The World Trade Organization is a multilateral trading system that came into existence in January 1995. Some 
pose the argument if the WTO is at all multilateral by saying Russia and Ukraine are not even members of the WTO. 
However, as of July 23, 2008 the WTO has 153 members and 30 more on observer status. Full list of countries and 
country specific reports available at http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm accessed on 
02/10/2009.  
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research paper. The first part deals with the legal and historical background of RTAs.  It 
answers question of why states enter into RTAs and what is the legal basis for the 
formation of RTAs. The second part deals with proliferation of RTAs. It answers 
question like are RTAs stumbling blocks or building blocks to the multilateral trading 
system. It also describes the causes of proliferation of RTAs and the possible solutions. 
The third part deals with the conclusions and recommendations. It tells the reader the 
overall conclusion of the paper and the best solution proposed. 
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PART I- Historical and legal background of Regional trading 
agreements under the WTO 
1.1. Introduction 
The whole purpose of the WTO is to lower tariff and non tariff barriers.3 “We know since 
Adam Smith the best way to do it is unilaterally and we also know from political economy that 
countries have hard time to do it unilaterally…” 4   Countries enter into multilateral trading 
agreements such as the WTO and various RTAs because they are afraid to lower tariffs and non 
tariff barriers unilaterally. 5  They cooperate to liberalize trade in an effort to constrain or 
eliminate restrictions on trade.  
RTAs achieve trade liberalization at a much faster speed and cover areas that are not yet 
covered by the WTO. 6  Some countries enter into RTAs for political reasons. “International 
cooperation is not about the elimination of economic externalities only but also political 
externalities.”7  For instance, the African Caribbean Pacific (herein after ACP) and European 
Union Economic partnership agreement is an example of trade agreement based on political 
                                                            
3 The WTO has been working to lower tariffs and non tariff barriers through its successive negotiations. For 
instance, Article II and art XI of GATT requires states to bind their tariffs and prohibits quantitative restrictions. 
4 Garry Hofbuer from Peterson Institute of International Economics at Washington DC, WTO public forum 
2007,  http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/debates_e/debate3_e.htm   accessed on 10/11/2008. 
5 The GATT has substantially lowered tariffs and non-tariff barriers through the successive rounds it has passed. For 
instance, “While postwar tariffs averaged some 40 percent in industrial goods, MFN tariffs among industrialized 
countries will be down from 6.3 percent (Tokyo Round) to an average of 3.8 upon implementation of the Uruguay 
Round.”  Thomas Cottier, The Challenge of WTO Law: Collected Essays, Cameron May Ltd, 2007, at 513. 
6 Gary Hofbuer, Supra note 2. 
7 Alexander Keck et al, “Indisputably Essential: The Economics of Dispute Settlement Institutions in Trade 
Agreements”, World Trade Organization Economic Research and Statistics Division, September 2007 at 7.  
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reasons. The agreement covers ACP countries that were former colonies of European Union.8  
Some regional trade agreements are also driven by economic reasons. Countries enter into RTAs 
to eliminate constraints on trade. Trade protection by one country can affect the benefits of 
another state.9  
1.2. Drafting History 
The drafting history of article XXIV of GATT dates back to the International Trade 
Organization.10 “The provisions in the Havana Charter on economic integration arrangements 
differed considerably from the corresponding provisions in previous drafts of the Charter.”11  
Unlike the previous drafts that only recognized the establishment of customs unions the Havana 
Charter incorporated a provision for the formation of Free Trade Agreements. In the previous 
drafts Free Trade Agreements were allowed as an interim agreement that lead to customs unions. 
This regional trading arrangements provision was adopted in GATT-1947 and later on in the 
WTO through the Uruguay Round.  
                                                            
8 Informal discussion with Maria Fariello, EU lawyer in Eritrea, January 19, 2009, at about 9:00 p.m. We were 
discussing why the African countries agreed to join the Cotonou Agreement (ACP-EU) agreement and she told me 
that some countries join regional trading agreements for the compensation package offered by the developed 
countries. See also Oliver Cadot et al, ‘Can Bilateralism Ease the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalization?’ World 
Trade Organization-Economic Research Analysis Division, June 1998.  In this article the authors analyzed the 
impact of compensation package in regional trading agreements and concluded that regional trading agreements 
with compensation package tend to be more successful. 
9 For instance, if country A prohibits entry for goods produced in country B, the welfare of country B is affected by 
protectionist restrictions imposed by country A. If the goods manufactured in country B are produced by imports 
from country C, the protectionist measures of country A can affect also country C. 
10 The International Trade Organization was an organization (herein after ITO) that was intended to be established in 
the Breton Woods Agreement at the same time with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Some 
attribute the failure of the establishment of the ITO to the United States Congress and President Truman. That is to 
say because US, the largest economy, did not ratify the charter establishing the ITO it was doomed to failure. Then 
certain countries entered into a provisional agreement, GATT that led to the WTO. For a brief explanation of the 
failure of the ITO and the Havana Charter refer to Julio Lacarte Muro’s interview with the Keith Rockwell (WTO 
spokesperson) about how the trading system evolved available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/debates_e/interview1_e.htm accessed on January 10,2009. 
11 Multilateral Trade Negotiations – Uruguay Round, 11 August, 1987. Note by the Secretariat on Article XXIV,at 7. 
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 1.3 Formation of Regional Trading Agreements 
The first wave of regional trading agreements was primarily North-North and South-
South Agreements.12  “North- South arrangements appeared during the 1980s.”13 When a WTO 
member enters into a regional trading agreement it departs from the main pillars of non-
discrimination.14 However, Article XXIV of General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (herein 
after, GATT), article V of General Agreement on Trade in Services (herein after GATS) and the 
Enabling clause15 allow member countries to enter into regional trading agreements.  Since the 
wording and terminologies of article XXIV of GATT and article V of GATS are similar; for the 
purpose of this study we will just deal with article XXIV of GATT. Since the number of regional 
trading agreements notified under the Enabling clause is so small the study will not deal with it. 
                                                            
12 Oliver Cadot et al, ‘Can Bilateralism Ease the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalization?’ World Trade 
Organization- Economic Research Analysis Division, June 1998, at 6. North-North agreements means regional 
trading agreements among developed countries and likewise South-South means the once entered among developing 
countries. It was also generally thought that the North-North agreements are successful as compared with the South-
South agreements. 
13 Id. Note that Art V of GATS allows for Special and differential treatment for developing countries in regional 
trading agreements unlike article XXIV of GATT. In the current Doha Negotiation the ACP countries submitted a 
proposal to amend article XXIV(8) of GATT to allow the S and D treatment for developing countries. In an in depth 
study of regional trading agreements and their implication for developing countries,  UNCTAD concluded that 
developing countries should proceed carefully with regard to North-South regional trading agreements. The study 
concluded that North-South agreements tend to ignore the development perspective. The GATT rules require 
reciprocity in North-South agreements and erode preferences. The developed countries tend to ask for WTO plus 
standard due to the unbalanced negotiating power between developed and developing countries. 
14 The relevant non-discrimination principles of the WTO are the National treatment (Article I) and the Most 
Favored Nation Treatment (Article III). The main principle of Article I is that member states are not allowed to 
discriminate imported goods from locally produced good once they are inside the border. Article III of the GATT 
enumerates the Most Favored Nation Treatment which basically means that countries are not allowed to discriminate 
among other WTO member trading partners. 
15 The Enabling Clause (i.e., the 1979 Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and 
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries) also allows the formation of Regional Trading Agreements among 
developing countries without the requirement of non-reciprocity. For further explanation of the enabling clause and 
the full text of the clause refer to, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/enabling1979_e.htm , accessed on 
March 13, 2009. 
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 1.4 Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas 
Article XXIV of GATT allows the formation of Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas. 
According to Article XXIV (8(a)) a Customs Union “… shall be understood to mean the 
substitution of a single customs territory for two or more customs territories.”16 Members of a 
Customs Union are mandated to have a ‘substantially the same’ customs policy against other 
states that are not members of the customs union. 17  Whereas a Free Trade Agreement mandates 
members to open up ‘substantially all trade’ amongst themselves as defined in Article XXIV 
(8(b))  and it does not require the existence of common customs policy towards nonmembers. 
Scholars have debated the interpretation of article XXIV of GATT.  There are different 
issues that can be raised with the interpretation of Article XXIV. For the purpose of this study we 
are just focusing on ‘substantially all trade.’ The reason we are discussing this particular issue is 
because it will be relevant to our discussion in part two and three of this paper. 
                                                            
16 Article XXIV (8) states,  
“For the purposes of this Agreement:  
 (a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single customs 
territory for two or more customs territories, so that 
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those 
permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with respect to 
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of the union or at least with 
respect to substantially all the trade in products originating in such territories, and, 
(ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties and other 
regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade of 
territories not included in the union…” 
17 The Appellate Body in the Turkey-Textiles case said ‘substantially all’ under article XXIV (8(a)) doesn’t mean  
all. 
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Past discussions in the GATT indicate that the term ‘substantially all’ has both qualitative 
and quantitative aspects. “Regarding the quantitative aspect, it has been suggested that a general 
figure could be fixed for the percentage of volume of liberalized trade within a free trade area 
which should be considered as meeting the ‘substantially all …’ requirement.” 18  However, 
arguments were raised how inappropriate it would be to measure trade liberalization just in 
quantitative measurements. The qualitative aspect of the ‘substantially all’ requirement is that the 
regional trade agreement should not exclude a particular sector or industry from the liberalization 
activity. The EU subscribes to this view and fixed that 80% of the volume of the trade should be 
included.19  
1.4 Conclusion 
Regional trade agreements achieve trade liberalization at a much faster speed. States 
enter into regional trading agreements both for political and economic reasons. When states enter 
into regional trading agreements Art XXIV of GATT requires that they liberalize ‘substantially 
all trade’ between them. The criteria for determining the substantially all requirement is both 
qualitative and quantitative aspects. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
18 Id. 
19 Thomas Cottier, The Challenge of WTO Law: Collected Essays, Cameron May Ltd., 2007, at 517. 
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 Part II – Proliferation of Regional Trading Agreements   
2.1. Stumbling blocks or Building blocks 
Regionalism and multilateralism are complementary. 20  “While we may see them as 
competing legal approaches, in a combination they assist in the process of dismantling of trade 
barriers.” 21The WTO rules are constitutional frame work of rights and obligations of member 
countries in international trade. “The rules of GATT Article XXIV, GATS Article V and the 
Enabling Clause could be interpreted as setting the multilateral constitutional limits within which 
RTAs can maneuver.”22  The formation of regional trading arrangements is an exception to the 
general principles of WTO. 23That is to say, states are allowed to enter into RTAs as long as 
those agreements are consistent with the existent WTO rules. 
The problem at the moment is that there are more than 400 regional trading agreements. 
24  Each regional arrangement is unique. The working provision of the arrangement and the 
                                                            
20 The argument of whether regional trading agreements are stumbling blocks or building blocks in the multilateral 
trading system revolves over the idea of the impact of the formation of regional trading agreements. Regional trade 
agreements can create trade to the contracting parties and it can also create trade diversion to non members of the 
agreement. Trade creation is in a sense that regional trading agreements tend to create access to bigger market 
among contracting parties. It diverts trade for non-members in a sense that it gives preference in the form of 
reduction of tax value for members of the regional trading agreement. “WTO rules are an attempt to encourage trade 
creation, and to avoid diversion.” Thomas Cottier, The Challenges of WTO Law: Collected Essays”, Cameron May 
Ltd, 2007, at 516. The WTO rules try to avoid trade diversion by including the ‘substantially all requirement we 
discussed in first part of this paper.’ 
21 Thomas Cottier, Supra note 19 at 514. 
22 Youri Devouyist et al, The World Trade Organization and Regional Trading agreements: Bridging the 
Constitutionality Gap, Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, Vol 18.1, 2007 at 4.  
23 Peter Van Den Bossche, The law and Policy of World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials, Cambridge 
University Press, 2005, at 650. 
24 Out of those 400 regional trading agreements only 227 are in force. For a complete list of Regional Trading 
Agreements and their legal basis see http://rtais.wto.org/UI/publicPreDefRepByWTOLegalCover accessed on 
02/10/2009. 
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reasons for forming the regional integration differs from one to the other. Regional trading 
agreements offer preferential treatment to members of the regional integration in violation of the 
Non-discrimination principles of the WTO. 25   To administer the preferential treatment 
effectively, to exclude products exported from non-member, the members of the regional trading 
agreement craft rules of origin. This results into a lot of crisscrossing resulting into the ‘spaghetti 
bowl’ problem.26  
One of the causes of the proliferation of regional trading agreements is the stalemate 
situation in the multilateral trading system as it goes between rounds.27  For instance, “in the 
period 1948-1994, the GATT received 124 notifications of RTAs (relating to trade in goods), and 
since the creation of the WTO in 1995, almost 300 additional arrangements covering trade in 
goods or services have been notified.”28  
The surge in regional trading agreements could also be driven by search for access to 
larger markets in the absence of a willingness among WTO members to liberalize trade further. 
Henry Gao29 and C. L. Lim30 believe that the existence of the WTO is being eclipsed into 
irrelevance with the unabated surge in Regional Trading agreements.31  At this moment this 
                                                            
 
25 See Supra note 13 for explanation of the non-discrimination principles of the WTO. 
26 Jagdish Bhagwati, Termites in the Trading System, Oxford University Press, 2008, at 120. 
27 Jagdish Bhagwati, Professor Columbia University, Supra note 2. 
28 Regional Trading Agreements, Facts and Figures, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm. 
Almost all WTO members are parties to one or more regional trading arrangement and some are members to more 
than twenty regional trading agreements.   
29 Henry Gao is Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
30 C.L. Lim is Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, the University of Hong Kong 
31 Henry Gao  et al, “Saving the WTO from the risk of irrelevance, the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism as a 
‘common good’ for RTA dispute”, Journal of International Economic Law 11(4), Advance Access publication 30 
October 2008, at  899.  
Thomas Cottier argued that preferential agreements have a limited impact on the global trading system. “The lack of 
supranational structures in many other multilateral agreements inherently limits a process of liberalization much 
12 
 
might be an overstatement as we see the WTO’s successes but if no action is taken to harmonize 
those regional trading agreements it is inevitable that it will be eclipsed into irrelevance. At 
present a huge portion of world trade goes through those regional trading arrangements which 
deny the Most Favored Nation Treatment to other WTO members.32  The surge in regional 
trading agreements also created very complicated rules of origin. Hence the need for 
harmonization of regional trading agreements becomes necessary.  
 
This chart shows all RTAs notified to the GATT/WTO (1994-2008).33 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
beyond the dismantling of traditional barriers.” Supra note 19 at 514. In his argument he says that the MFN tariff 
rate in GATT has been substantially reduced by the successive rounds. He also raises a point saying that most 
preferential trade agreements other than the EEC and NAFTA do not liberalize trade in agriculture. Thirdly he 
argues with the reduction of tariffs and quantitative restriction, countervailing duties and other non-tariff barriers 
have become important. He also argues that there is a political limit to what preferential agreements can achieve. 
32 Jagdish Bhagwati, Supra note 4. See Supra note 14 for a brief explanation of the Most Favored Nation Treatment 
under the WTO. 
33 This chart is taken from http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm, accessed on March 19, 
2009. When looking at this chart note the important dates for analyzing the chart. The Doha Negotiation Round of 
November 2001 and the rise of notified regional trading agreements especially after the Cancun failure in 2003.   
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In the next part of this paper we will discuss the various options that WTO members can 
adopt to solve the problem of proliferation of regional trading agreements. 
2.2. Harmonization of Regional Trading Agreements 
A number of proposals have been presented for the harmonization of regional trading 
agreements after the coming into effect of the Uruguay Round. “One proposal was that the 
creation of preferential trade agreements requires tariff reductions with third members.” 34  
Another proposal submitted was to guarantee a level of trade with third parties. None of those 
proposals materialized. 
The best tactic to approach the surge in regional trading agreements is to reduce all trade 
barriers to zero at the multilateral level. Reducing trade barriers at the multilateral level will 
render regional trading agreements ineffective. However, this option does not seem plausible for 
three reasons: 
1. The membership of the WTO is so big that countries might not choose to liberalize trade 
for their enemies which could be members of the WTO. As we saw in the first part of the 
paper countries enter into regional trading agreements not only for economic reasons but 
also for political and security reasons.  
2. Members of the various regional trading agreements might not agree to lower trade 
barriers at the WTO level to zero in order to protect the benefits they are reaping from 
those RTAs. 
3. RTAs might cover sectors not yet under the WTO.  
                                                            
34 Thomas Cottier, Supra note 19 at 519. 
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The second best option for the harmonization of RTAs is to strengthen the WTO’s 
monitoring system of RTAs, with the 2006 rules on transparency being the most recent 
example.35 The critique against this approach is that the WTO committee on trade has been 
plagued by ineffectiveness due to the consensus ruling making procedure of the WTO.  
The third best option for the harmonization or RTAs is to draft ‘best practice’ RTA at the 
multilateral level.36  The idea is if countries adopt the model RTA when they enter into RTAs 
then it will result into harmonization of regional trading agreements and it will also lead into the 
development of common law37 of RTAs. However, it can also lead to further fragmentation as 
states take and customize the model RTA to their particular need and concerns.  
The third option would be to harmonize the existent rules of origin. The proliferation of 
regional trading agreements created very complicated rules of origin on identical products. “With 
the exception of the pan-European system of cumulation of origin which harmonizes the rules of 
origin of some 30 Regional Trading Agreements …, most other Free Trade Agreements in force 
have their own distinct origin regime.”38  This added with the different tariff rates results into 
crisscrossing of preferences creating the spaghetti bowl problem. 39  “Rules of origin are 
                                                            
35 The 2006 rules on transparency deal with the notification of Regional Trading Agreements to the WTO. Regional 
Trading agreements formed under GATT art XXIV and GATS art V are administered by the Committee on 
Regional Trading agreements. For further discussion of the transparency rule refer 
to http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/trans_mecha_e.htm accessed on 02/10/2009. 
36 Henry Gao et al, Supra note 31. 
37 The term common law here is not here used as in the common law legal system. Here it is used to mean the same 
or similar law. 
38  Regional Trade Agreements Section et al, The Challenging Landscape of RTAs, presented at the seminar on 
Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO, WTO Secretariat, Geneva, 14 November 2003, pp 11. 
39 Jagdish Bhagwati, Supra note 26. 
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intentionally designed as devices to deny non RTA members preferences, it is doubtful whether 
WTO member countries would be willing to get rid of these carefully crafted devices.”40 
In the next section we will discuss the WTO dispute settlement body as a means for the 
harmonization of RTAs.  At this moment the harmonization of RTAs through the WTO dispute 
settlement body seems the most realistic solution to the proliferation of RTAs. 
2.3. WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
Before the Uruguay Round, when an RTA is challenged for its consistency with article 
XXIV of GATT, the power to make recommendations was exclusively vested in the contracting 
states.41 During the Uruguay Round this has changed. “The Understanding on the interpretation 
of article XXIV of the GATT extends the jurisdiction of panels to include review of preferential 
trade agreements.”42 
Regional trading agreements are contracts entered into between states. Regional trading 
agreements can be effective if the parties exert political will to abide by the terms of their 
agreement and if it has an effective dispute settlement mechanism in case a dispute arises. 
Regional trading agreements are enforceable if the agreement is observable, verifiable and 
                                                            
40 Henry Gao et al, Surpa note 31 at 4. 
41 Article XXIV (7(a)) states, “Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free-trade area, or an 
interim agreement leading to the formation of such a union or area, shall promptly notify the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES and shall make available to them such information regarding the proposed union or area as will enable 
them to make such reports and recommendations to contracting parties as they may deem appropriate.” 
42 Thomas Cottier, Supra note 19 at 519- 520. Article 12 explicitly states that: “the provisions of Article XXII and 
XIII of GATT 1994, as elaborated and applied by the Settlement Understanding may be invoked with respect to any 
mater arising from the application of those provisions of Article XXIV relating to customs unions, free-trade areas 
or interim agreements leading to the formation of a customs union or free trade area.” Thomas Cottier, Supra note 
19 at 519- 520. 
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quantifiable.43 Observablity is the obligations of the parties set out in the agreement should be 
something that can be done.44 When we say verifiable, it means that it should be something that 
can be within the terms of the regional trade agreement. 45  Quantifiablity deals with the 
assessment of damages in case of breach of the agreement.46  
To analyze if the WTO dispute settlement mechanism can be a solution for the 
harmonization of regional trading agreements we should first consider the following issues. The 
first thing to consider is the issue of jurisdiction. That is to say will the WTO dispute settlement 
body have jurisdiction over RTA disputes? As we discussed in the previous section some RTAs 
cover areas that are not yet covered by the WTO. For instance, when it comes to disputes dealing 
with Article 11 of NAFTA47 the WTO dispute settlement body will not have jurisdiction.  
The second issue to analyze is what happens when RTA has an overlapping obligation 
with the WTO.48  For instance, almost all RTAs impose the National Treatment obligation.49 In 
such, cases the WTO dispute settlement body will have jurisdiction.  
                                                            
43 Alexander keck, Supra note 7, at 7. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 NAFTA is a free trade agreement between US, Canada and Mexico. Even though article 20 of NAFTA stipulates 
that a NAFTA member can pursue its rights both under the NAFTA and WTO law when it comes to investor state 
claims (Article 11 of NAFTA deals with investor-state claims.) the WTO dispute settlement body does not have 
jurisdiction. For further discussion of the overlapping obligations under NAFTA and WTO law the Appellate Body 
Report on Mexico-Tax measures on Soft Drinks and other Beverages. In this case the US blocked the establishment 
of a panel under NAFTA and brought a claim against Mexico under the WTO dispute settlement body for violation 
of the national treatment principle. In this case the jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement body was not 
challenged by Mexico. Instead, Mexico was arguing that the Panel should have declined to exercise its jurisdiction. 
The appellate body rejected Mexico’s argument and concluded that there is no legal impediment that precludes the 
Panel from exercising jurisdiction. John H. Jackson et al, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, 5th 
ed. Thomson West, 2008, at 517 -520. 
48 MERCOSUR is a customs union between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, and Venezuela.  A 
MERCOSUR member can bring a case both in the MERCOSUR dispute settlement forum and the WTO forum. 
Brazil brought a complaint against Argentina in the MERCOSUR dispute settlement body and lost. Later on Brazil 
brought the complaint to the WTO dispute settlement body.  The panel entertained the case and rejected if Res-
17 
 
The third issue to analyze is what happens when RTA has provisions that are contrary to 
the WTO rules. In such instance, the WTO dispute settlement body will have jurisdiction over 
the issue.50 The interpretation of ‘substantially all trade’ under article XXIV can be a major issue 
to challenge the inconsistency of RTAs with the WTO rules. When the WTO dispute settlement 
body examines a regional trading agreement and found it to be inconsistent with the WTO rules, 
it doesn’t make the agreement null and void but rather gives third parties the right to bring their 
claim. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Judicata and estoppel can be applied here. John H. Jackson et al, Legal Problems of International Economic 
Relations, 5th ed. Thomson West, 2008, at 517. 
49 For an explanation of national Treatment under refer to Supra note 14. 
50 In Turkey Textiles case the WTO dispute settlement panel found, that Turkey’s violation of GATT Art. XI and 
XII are not justified by GATT article XXIV. In this case the Appellate Body agreed with the conclusion of the panel 
even though it was for a different reason. For a brief discussion of the Turkey Textiles case refer to Michael J. 
Trebilcock et al, The regulation of International Trade, 3rd ed, Routledge, 2005, at 197.  
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Part III- Conclusions and Recommendations 
Regional trading agreements are here to stay. They have been successful to achieve greater 
economic and political integration in the world. Case in point the European Union is the best 
example of deeper integration. However, they have proliferated in such an enormous amount that 
they have created a lot of crisscrossing and different rules of origin. Hence, the need for 
harmonizing them is a timely call.  
The most realistic way to harmonize regional trading agreements is through the WTO dispute 
settlement body. The WTO dispute settlement body has a well developed jurisprudence of over 
50 years and has been effective. States should opt for a choice of forum of the WTO dispute 
settlement body when they enter into RTAs. If the WTO dispute settlement body started 
handling RTA disputes at the end we will have a common jurisprudence or law of RTAs. This 
eventually will lead to the harmonization of RTAs. However, the monitoring and transparency 
requirements that are administered by the committee on regional trading agreements should also 
be enhanced side by side. 
   
19 
 
Bibliography 
1. Garry Hofbuer and Jagdish Bhagwati, WTO public forum 
2007,  http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/debates_e/debate3_e.htm   accessed on 
10/11/2008. 
2. The 2006 rules on transparency deal with the notification of Regional Trading 
Agreements to the 
WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/trans_mecha_e.htm accessed on 
02/10/2009. 
3. Regional Trading Agreements fact 
sheet, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm, accessed on March 
19, 2009. 
4. Alexander Keck et al, “Indisputably Essential: The Economics of Dispute Settlement 
Institutions in Trade Agreements”, World Trade Organization Economic Research and 
Statistics Division, September 2007.  
5. Henry Gao et al, “Saving the WTO from the risk of irrelevance, the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism as a ‘common good’ for RTA dispute”, Journal of International 
Economic Law 11(4), Advance Access publication 30 October 2008.  
6. Jagdish Bhagwati, Termites in the Trading System, Oxford University Press, 2008. 
7. Peter Van Den Bossche, The law and Policy of World Trade Organization: Text, Cases 
and Materials, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
8. Oliver Cadot et al, ‘Can Bilateralism Ease the Pains of Multilateral Trade 
Liberalization?’ World Trade Organization- Economic Research Analysis Division, June 
1998. 
20 
 
21 
 
9. Thomas Cottier, The Challenge of WTO Law: Collected Essays, Cameron May Ltd., 
2007. 
10. . John H. Jackson et al, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, 5th ed. 
Thomson West, 2008. 
11. Michael J. Trebilcock et al, The regulation of International Trade, 3rd ed, Routledge, 
2005. 
12. Regional Trade Agreements Section et al, The Challenging Landscape of RTAs, 
presented at the seminar on Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO, WTO Secretariat, 
Geneva, 14 November 2003. 
13. Youri Devouyist et al, The World Trade Organization and Regional Trading agreements: 
Bridging the Constitutionality Gap, Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, 
Vol 18.1, 2007. 
14. The Enabling clause, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/enabling1979_e.htm , 
accessed on March 13, 2009. 
15. Julio Lacarte Muro’s interview with the Keith Rockwell (WTO spokesperson)  The 
Multilateral Trading System in 
60,  http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/debates_e/interview1_e.htm accessed on 
January 10,  2009. 
16. Multilateral Trade Negotiations – Uruguay Round, 11 August, 1987. Note by the 
Secretariat on Article XXIV. 
17. GATT-1947 and GATT-
1994, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#services accessed on 
March 13, 2009. 
